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Sexuality: Problems and Perspectives 
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Introduction 
When discussing Strachey’s translation of Freud (Freud, 1905/1953) the first problem 
that pops up is almost inevitably his translation of the German Trieb by “instinct.” Instincts, 
as the standard objection goes, have a predetermined object that is given to them by nature to 
accomplish their biological function, whereas this wouldn’t be the case with Triebe that don’t 
have such a pre-given object. Since Freud fundamentally questions the idea of (human) 
sexuality as a biological function that aims at reproduction, Strachey should have translated 
Trieb in the contexts where it refers to sexuality, for example, as “drive” in order to clearly 
mark this difference. With regard to self-preservation, Instinkt would have been a possible 
translation. Indeed, there is or seems to be (things could indeed be much more complicated 
then we think) a much more intrinsic link between self-preservation and its object than 
between (human) sexuality and its object. Furthermore this would imply that Trieb/drive is 
typically human. Indeed, animal sexuality is in this line of thought quite often—rightly or 
wrongly—considered an exclusively reproductive function.  
But are things really that simple? In the way I just formulated the problem, it has a 
very a “lacanian” sound: Lacan stresses over and over again the nonbiological character of 
the drive (pulsion/dérive) and of desire that, in humans, would be an effect of language. 
Lacan—as well as Laplanche—stress the passage in which Freud claims that the Trieb has no 
natural object (this passage is virtually the conclusion of Freud’s analysis of 
homosexuality/inversion) and concludes from this that Trieb is not instinct (that does have a 
natural object) and hence should be translated differently: pulsion/dérive (Lacan, 1966, 
pp.851–854). All of this implies that the decision not to translate Trieb as instinct is made on 
the basis of a specific reading of Freud’s text and, as I will argue, of a problematic privileging 
of specific passages. 
To further discuss this question I will turn to the first edition of the Three Essays, and 
I will comment on some key decisions that Ulrike Kistner, Herman Westerink, and I made in 
discussing the first English translation of this text (Freud, 1905/2016). In doing so I will 
concentrate on a major distinction Freud makes in the Three Essays that passed unnoticed (or 
even rendered invisible) in most translations. I will argue, more concretely, that the 1905 
edition of the Three Essays is not so much centered around the distinction between Instinkt 
and Trieb, but rather around the distinction between Geschlechtstrieb and Sexualtrieb. This 
distinction is completely lost in the Standard Edition and in the older French translations.1 
Strachey translates them both as “sexual instinct.” This second distinction resembles the one 
between Instinkt and Trieb, but it is not identical to it. It should further be read in relation to 
the term Geschlechtsleben that is linked to it. 
 
Geslechtstrieb vs. Sexualtrieb 
Before debating this translation/interpretation, let me first make a quick remark on 
Freud’s use of the terms Trieb and Instinkt in the Three Essays. First of all, in Freud’s days 
the German Trieb wasn’t opposed to what we today call instinct. Freud uses Trieb for both 
human beings and animals and he doesn’t restrict it to sexuality. Quite the contrary, as early 
as the opening sentences of his text he speaks of a Trieb nach Nährungsaufnahme and he 
further mentions the Geschlechtstrieb that humans and animals have in common. 
Furthermore, the word Instinkt doesn’t occur in the text, or rather it is only used once as an 
adjective (Freud, 1905, 23; 1905/1953, 164; 1905/2016, 25). Hence we can safely assume 
that the Trieb/Instinkt distinction as such was not really an issue that explicitly interested 
Freud very much, or that it had much weight in the articulation of his theory.  
But let us now turn to the distinction between Geschlechtstrieb and Sexualtrieb. This 
distinction can best be explained by referring to the semantic contexts in which the terms 
involved are used. Indeed, Freud tends to systematically use Geslechtstrieb in semantic 
contexts in which he is talking about the “poetic fable” that claims sexuality is an instinct 
absent in childhood and that aims at reproduction (Freud, 1905, 2; 1905/1953, 136; 
1905/2016, 2). Freud also uses the term more generally with regard to adult object-related 
and genitalized sexuality so that it also covers inversion or homosexuality. Sexualtrieb, on the 
contrary, is mainly used with regards to nonreproductive forms of sexuality in which the 
genital zone doesn’t play a leading role (in particular the perversions) or that are in principle 
autoerotic or objektlos (Freud, 1905, 72; 1905/1953, 233; 1905/2016, 82).2 The latter 
																																																								
1 The only translation I am aware of that takes the distinction we are discussing here into 
account is the new French edition that was realised under the direction of Jean Laplanche. 
Geslechtstrieb is translated as pulsion sexuée, and sexualtrieb as pulsion sexuelle (Freud, 
1905/2006). Laplanche’s argumentation with regard to this distinction is in a certain way 
quite close to ours: Geschlechtstrieb/pulsion sexuée refers to adult sexuality and 
sexualtrieb/pulsion sexuelle refers to infantile sexuality (Laplanche, 2007, pp.7–25). 
However, Laplanche thematizes this distinction in a way that is that is fundamentally 
different from ours. Discussing this difference in detail would lead us too far astray. 
2 In the first pages of the original edition of the Three Essays, Freud consistently writes 
characterizes infantile sexuality that for the same reason is non-phantasmatical and can be 
described in purely physiological terms: search for nonfunctional bodily pleasures. In this 
sense Geschlechtstrieb and Sexualtrieb refer to two clearly defined and opposing sexual 
regimes.  
The opposition between these two regimes informs the structure of Freud’s 1905 text. 
The exclusive emphasis on the passage on the variability of object of the drive that I 
mentioned in the introduction tends to obscure this opposition. Indeed, this passage is further 
linked to other passages that were added in 1915, after the publication of Triebe und 
Triebschicksale (“Instincts and their vicissitudes”), according to which the drive is directed 
from the outset to the object as such. As a result, the emphasis shifts from an opposition 
between a (non-objectal) Sexualtrieb and a (object-related) Geslechtstrieb as two different 
sexual regimes to a distinction between Instinkt (adequate object: animals) and drive 
(variable object: humans). These two distinctions are clearly linked, but they are not 
identical. Most importantly, the shift in emphasis that I just mentioned hides the 
philosophical problematic/potential of the distinction between Sexualtrieb and Geslechtstrieb 
once and for all from view. 
 
Translating Sexualtrieb and Geschlechtstrieb 
So if it is crucial not to obscure the distinction between Sexualtrieb and Geslechtstrieb 
in the translation, how can we translate these terms? Since Freud never uses Instinkt in the 
Three Essays although it does (and did) exist in German, it is reasonable not to use “instinct” 
as a translation for Trieb. “Drive” seems to be the better option, also because it keeps the link 
with the body and bodily existence. As far as Geschlecht is concerned, it is worth noting as a 
kind of preliminary remark that the sex-gender distinction that we are so familiar with 
doesn’t play a role in Freud’s text. This distinction was only introduced in the 1950s and 60s. 
In the word Geschlecht, then, the sex-gender distinction doesn’t play a role yet. Also there is 
no equivalent word for Geschlecht in English. In light of what I said earlier—
Geschlechtstrieb refers to object-centered genital sexuality—“genital drive” seems the better 
																																																																																																																																																																												
Geslechtstrieb. In these pages Freud shows how homosexuality (inversion) undermines the 
“poetic fable” we already discussed. In the remaining part of the first chapter Geslechtstrieb 
is hardly used. Freud there discusses the sexual aberrations with regard to the aim of the 
(sexual) drive (perversions) in which the genital zone doesn’t play a determining role. In the 
chapter on infantile, autoerotic (objektlos) sexuality, Geslechtstrieb is only mentioned four 
times, whereas Sexualtrieb is used ten times. These two words are used elsewhere in the text 
in the semantic contexts that I indicated.  
 
option (rather than “coïtal drive,” even if that had also been an option in English, but it 
excludes inverts in the context of which Freud also speaks of Geschlechtstrieb). Sexualtrieb, 
then, can obviously be translated as “sexual drive.” We decided to translate Geschlechtsleben 
that also refers to human sexuality as such as “sex life” (“sex life” expresses quite well the 
generic meaning of Geschlechtsleben). We used “sex life” and not “sexual life” in these 
instances—although the latter would have been possible too—in order to safeguard the 
opposition between Geschlechtstrieb and Sexualtrieb that we consider fundamental to the 
understanding of the text.  
“Genital drive” can appear questionable in places where Freud uses Geschlechtstrieb” 
as a pars pro toto. “Sex drive” would have been an option in these cases, but that would have 
required that we translate the same German word (Geslechtstrieb) by two different English 
terms depending on the context. That is not impossible, but it wouldn’t have been very 
elegant from the perspective of the translation. Beyond that—and more importantly—we 
thought that changing the translation of Geschlechtstrieb depending on the context in which it 
occurs risked blurring the structural distinction between two regimes of sexuality—adult and 
infantile—that determines in many ways this first edition of the Three Essays. It is clear that 
the absence of a direct English equivalent for Geschlecht obliges us to look for a 
compromise. Since the context in most cases leaves no doubt of the generic use of 
Geschlechtstrieb—for instance, where Freud writes that the sexualtrieb is its first moment or 
phase—we think that it isn’t too problematic to consistently translate Geschlechtstrieb as 
“genital drive.” 
 
Conclusion: Translating Freud, Interpreting Freud 
A further reason why we decided to consistently translate Geschlechtstrieb with the 
same word is that we wanted to avoid the translation being too “interpretative.” One of the 
problems with Strachey’s translation is precisely that: it tends to introduce connotations that 
are not really in Freud—for instance, where he translates psychisch as “mental”—or by 
stressing through his translation one particular line of thought that even when it is present in 
Freud’s text, doesn’t have the exclusive character that it risks getting in translation. A good 
example of this problem is Strachey’s translation of partialtrieb as “component instinct.” I 
already discussed the translation of Trieb as “instinct.” The translation of “partial” as 
“component” stresses the idea of possible completeness, or of a possible integration: the 
component is an element of a larger whole—that is not so present in “partial.” It is true that 
the idea of a progressive integration of the different partialtriebe into one whole (or under the 
dominance of the genital zone, and what does this mean then?) is present in Freud, and it is 
also true that he sometimes presents this idea as the ultimate goal of human development. But 
this is definitely not the only line of thought in Freud’s text. Since we can easily translate 
partial as “partial,” there is no reason to emphasize one particular concept—completeness—
at the expense of other tendencies, and more particularly at the expense of the richness of 
Freud’s text.  
 
Philippe Van Haute is a professor at Radboud University in Nijmegen, the Netherlands and 




Freud, S. (1905). Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie. Leipzig, Germany: Deuticke. 
Freud, S. (1953). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. In J. Strachey (Ed. and 
Trans.), Standard edition (Vol. 7, pp. 125-245). London, England: Hogarth Press. (Original 
work published 1905) 
Freud, S. (2006). Trois essais sur la théorie de la sexualité. Oeuvres Complètes VI,  
59–182. (Original work published 1905) 
Freud, S. (2016). Three essays on the theory of sexuality: The 1905 edition (P. Van 
Haute, & H. Westerink, Eds; U.Kistner, transl.). London, England: Verso. (Original work 
published 1905) 
Lacan, J. (1966). Ecrits. Paris, France: Seuil. 
Laplanche, J. (2007). Pulsion et instinct. In Sexual. La sexualité élargie au sens 
freudien (2000–2006) (7-25). Paris, France: PUF (Quadrige). 
 
 
